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URBAN RENAISSANCE
SPACE, GOVERNMENTALITY,AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF
FRENCH URBAN POLICY
Mustafa Dikeç
Royal Holloway, University of London, UK
Abstract
This article seeks to make a contribution to debates
around governmentality and urban policy. The main
argument is that although there is a governmental
dimension to the constitution of spaces through urban
policy, there is no inherent politics to such constitu-
tions. Different ways of imagining space have different
implications for the constitution of problems and for-
mulation of solutions.This argument is substantiated by
an account of French urban policy (la politique de la
Ville) between 1981 and 2005, organized around three
periods.The first part of the article relates this policy
to the contemporary transformations of the French
state, and points to the relationship between urban
policy and the penal state.The second part presents an
account of this policy with a focus on the changing
conceptualizations of space, and their varying policy
and political implications.
KEY WORDS ★ banlieues ★ French urban policy ★
governmentality ★ penal state
Space in its Hegelian form comes back into its own. This
modern state promotes and imposes itself as the stable
center – definitively – of (national) societies and spaces
. . . In this same space there are, however, other forces on
the boil, because the rationality of the state, of its
techniques, plans and programs, provokes opposition.
(Lefebvre, 1991: 23)
Nothing, it seems, is more un-French than the
Lefebvrian city.1 The latter embodies contestation
and resistance, fosters political participation of all
city inhabitants in the production of their lived
spaces, and conceives space in its multiplicity and
relationality as socially produced and decidedly
political, while France embodies unity and
homogeneity, technocratic and paternalistic state
tradition operating on a space divided into discrete
pieces and devoid of politics. Yet when it comes to
French urban policy, Lefebvrian notions become
manifest; social development, self-management
(autogestion), participation of inhabitants, right to
difference, and right to the city have more than
occasionally appeared in French urban policy
documents in the last two decades or so.2
But something happened towards the end of the
1990s. Such notions – though at times little more
than merely gestural – have gradually disappeared
from the official urban policy discourses. By the year
2005, references to self-management and
participation of inhabitants had completely gone,
social development gave way to tax concession areas,
and the only right to be defended in the official
discourse became the so-called ‘right to security’.
This shift, it seems to me, tells us something
important about the concerns in contemporary
French urban policy in relation to the wider
restructuring of the French state. When French
urban policy was first conceived in the early 1980s as
a response to revolts in banlieues, it sought to create a
political dynamic with such strong political ideals as
‘democratization of the management of the city’,
‘appropriation of space by inhabitants’, and ‘right to
the city’. Two-and-a-half decades later, in the
autumn of 2005, banlieue revolts were suppressed by
unprecedented repressive measures with the
declaration of a state of emergency, making the
French state’s authoritarian restructuring more
evident. What is striking is that the social housing
neighbourhoods that experienced revolts were not
just any other neighbourhoods. They were, for the
most part, designated ‘priority neighbourhoods’ of
French urban policy (la politique de la Ville). This
policy was initiated by the Socialist Government
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following the so-called ‘hot-summer’ of 1981,
marked by incidents of unrest in the banlieues of
French cities. Under this policy, several social
housing neighbourhoods in banlieues were
designated as ‘priority neighbourhoods’ with an aim
to addressing their problems. Since then, the
geographies of urban policy and of revolts have
largely coincided. All but two of the areas where
large-scale revolts occurred in the 1990s were
priority neighbourhoods of urban policy. The revolts
of 2005 were no exception; 85 percent of the areas
where revolts occurred were neighbourhoods of
urban policy (Lagrange, 2006).
The increasingly authoritarian restructuring of
the French state has already been observed by many
researchers, who pointed to a shift from social to
penal forms of state intervention. Wacquant, in
particular, has conceptualized this orientation
among the European states with his notion of the
‘European penal state’. For Wacquant (2001), the
contemporary transformations of Western states are
marked by a ‘penalization of poverty’, which serves
to contain the negative effects of neo-liberal policies
on the lower classes. Thus, the increasing use of the
penal system serves to manage social insecurity, and
to contain social disorders induced by economic
deregulation and social-welfare retrenchment. But
not all the Western states follow the same pattern of
transformation. Although three interrelated
transformations – erasing the economic state,
dismantling the social state, and enhancing the penal
state – seem to capture, broadly, the contemporary
transformations of the state in the US or the UK, not
all of them apply to the Western European states.
What Wacquant calls the European penal state follows
the strong state tradition, and intensifies modes of
regulation, at once social and penal. The ‘left hand’ of
the state, though still active, is increasingly
accompanied by its ‘right hand’. There is an
intensification at once of social and penal treatments
of poverty, with an increased attention on the policing
function of the state, and a close surveillance of
populations seen to be problematic.
The French state’s contemporary
transformations resonate well with Wacquant’s
definition of the European penal state, which he
refers to as ‘the penalization of poverty à la française’
(2001: 407). I have elsewhere (Dikeç, 2006) referred
to this as the ‘republican penal state’ in order to
highlight the influence of established political
traditions in state restructuring – in this case, the
idea of the ‘Republican state’ and its social
obligations towards its citizens. Increasingly since
the 1990s, both social policy and penal forms of
intervention became key issues for governments of
the Left and the Right (Levy, 2001; Wacquant,
2001). But the shift towards the penal state was
largely legitimized around a discourse which
depicted ‘the one and indivisible Republic’ under
threat from allegedly incompatible cultural
differences and formation of ‘communities’, mainly in
the social housing neighbourhoods of the banlieues.
Especially from the early 1990s onwards, increasing
security measures have been directed towards social
housing neighbourhoods in banlieues. These included
the engagement of the Ministry of Justice and the
French Intelligence Service with the question of
banlieues in the early 1990s, the so-called ‘local
security contracts’ introduced by the Jospin
Government towards the end of the decade, and,
more recently, the avalanche of laws and security
measures introduced since 2002, which were
described by Michel Tubiana, the President of the
League of Human Rights, as ‘[t]he worst step back for
human rights since Algeria’ (Libération, 2004).
One of the principal spatial targets of these new
laws and measures has been the social housing
neighbourhoods in banlieues (Bonelli, 2003;
Wacquant, 2003), most of which were also
designated neighbourhoods of urban policy. The
‘geography’ which urban policy has helped to
consolidate through its designated neighbourhoods
became officially so accepted that when the French
Intelligence Service decided to engage with the
question of banlieues, it was the list of urban policy
neighbourhoods that they took as a starting point.
When the Ministry of Justice engaged with the issue
in a stated aim to restore the law, its measures aimed
mainly at the same neighbourhoods. Similarly, other
repressive measures (such as local security contracts,
Sarkozy’s flash-ball guns, and so on) and growing
anxieties about the ‘values of the republic’ were all
guided by the same spatial imaginary, which became
the basis for the consolidation of the republican
penal state from the 1990s onwards.
This suggests that the state’s spatial practices –
in this case, urban policy – have been an integral
part in the consolidation of the penal state in
France.3 The spaces of urban policy have become
the major sites upon and through which the penal
European Urban and Regional Studies 2007 14(4)
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state has been consolidated. However, the
relationship between the constitution of spaces of
intervention under urban policy and the
consolidation of the penal state is not
straightforward. As I will try to show, the French
case suggests that the ways in which space is
imagined and used in urban policy vary, which is
perhaps best exemplified by the differences between
this policy’s early – militant – years, and its
contemporary – statist – orientations.4 My aim in
this article is to chart these changes in French urban
policy, and to point to the relationship between
changing governmentalities and spatial
conceptualizations. More specifically, I would like to
argue that although there is a governmental
dimension to the constitution of spaces through
urban policy, there is no inherent politics to such
constitutions.
I start with a brief section which explains my
understanding of the implications of the notion of
governmentality for looking at urban policy with a
focus on space. I then introduce French urban policy,
and provide an account organized around the
changing spatial conceptualizations of its intervention
areas. I conclude with some observations on space,
governmentality and urban policy.
Governmentality, urban policy and space
In the past decade or so, there has been a growing
interest in approaching policy from a somewhat
‘non-traditional’ perspective. A number of scholars
inspired mainly, though not exclusively, by
Foucauldian social theory have attempted to go
beyond studying policy merely in terms of an
unproblematic ‘tool’ to be employed to address
‘given’ problems. One of the major contributions of
this expanding body of work has been its emphasis
on the construction of policy problems as part of the
policy-making process rather than taking policies as
responses to self-evident problems (see, among
others, Atkinson, 2000; Cochrane, 2000; Hajer, 1995;
Raco and Imrie, 2000).
One of the obvious implications of approaching
urban policy – as in other public policies – in this
way is to look at the ways in which problems to be
addressed are constituted as part of the very policy
process. There is, however, a more specific
implication for urban policy that derives from a
distinctive aspect of it; that is, space. As Cochrane
(2000: 532) notes, urban policy is distinctive
compared to other social policies in that it conceives
of its object spatially:
Urban policy . . . focuses on places and spatially
delimited areas or the groups of people associated with
them. Its problem definition starts from area rather than
individual or even social group, although, of course, a
concern with an area is often used as a coded way of
referring to a concern about the particular groups which
are believed to be concentrated in it.
This suggests that due attention be given to the
ways in which space is conceived in urban policy.
The spaces in which urban policy intervenes are not
already given spaces; they are constituted as part of
the policy process, and urban policy, in this sense,
has a governmental dimension. This aspect of urban
policy has already been noted in the governmentality
literature on urban policy However, changing
conceptualizations of space has received little
attention. I would like to argue, therefore, that
constitution of spaces through urban policy is not a
governmental practice in a univocal sense. Let me
elaborate.
One of the issues Foucault’s (1991) notion of
governmentality raises is the mutual constitution of
objects of governance and modes of thought –
mentality – which then makes specific forms of
intervention possible. Thus, the relevance of the
concept for studies of (urban) policy derives from its
emphasis on the mutual constitution of formation
and intervention as part of the activity of
governance, of which policy making is one aspect.
The emphasis on the mutual constitution of specific
forms of representation and intervention is indicated
by the semantic linking of ‘governing’ and
‘mentality’ (Lemke, 2001). This implies that
governmental practices cannot be considered
independently of the formation of the objects and
subjects of governance. As Thrift (1999: 276) notes,
following Rose (1996), one of the issues Foucault
intended to signify with the notion of
governmentality was the ways in which
governmental activities were based on particular
forms of political reasoning as conceptions of the
objects and subjects to be governed. This implies,
among other things, the constitution of ‘governable
spaces’. As Rose (1999: 36) wrote, in order
European Urban and Regional Studies 2007 14(4)
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‘[t]o govern, it is necessary to render visible the
space over which government is to be exercised’.
This formulation has useful implications for
analysis of urban policy, which depends on and
deploys particular spatial imaginaries. Urban policy
implies ‘a process of actual boundary shaping’, and
may be seen as an institutionalized spatial
arrangement (Shapiro and Neubauer, 1989: 303).
This makes it difficult to talk unproblematically
about the ‘spaces’ of urban policy, because, in this
view, they are constituted as part of the policy
process. It follows that governmental practices,
insofar as they involve both formation and
intervention, are not merely ‘confined’ to designated
spaces. They constitute those spaces as part of the
governing activity. If urban policy has a governmental
dimension, as I have suggested, then its spaces of
intervention are not merely the sites of this
governmental practice, but, first and foremost, its
outcomes. However, policy discourses and
programmes are guided by particular ways of
imagining space, which have different implications for
the constitution of problems and formulation of
solutions. In other words, how space is conceived
matters because urban policy conceives of its object
spatially. How do different urban policies imagine
their spaces of intervention? What kind of a spatial
imaginary do they constitute and act upon? What
difference do different ways of conceiving space make
for urban policy? Such questions have received little –
if any – attention in the geographical literature that
focuses on governmentality and urban policy.
The French case, however, suggests that they
should. As I will try to show below, although French
urban policy has been addressing practically the
same areas for years, the ways in which its
intervention areas were spatially conceptualized (and
discursively articulated) have changed remarkably.
This is not to imply that each succeeding
programme was a rupture with the preceding one.
In each of the periods I use to organize my account,
however, there was not only a discernible change in
forms of state intervention – with a shift from a
social to a penal approach – but also in the spatial
conceptualizations of intervention areas – from a
relational view of intervention areas to self-
contained areas with rigid boundaries. Different
ways of imagining space, I will argue, had different
implications for the constitution of problems and
formulation of solutions. Furthermore, each of the
changing conceptualizations followed different
political rationalities, understood as
conceptualizations and justifications of goals, ideals,
and principles of government (Rose and Miller,
1992; Simons, 1995). This implies that the
constitution of spaces through urban policy has a
governmental dimension, but there is no inherent
politics to such constitutions. It seems to me
important, therefore, to give adequate attention to
varying conceptualizations of space as they have
different policy and political implications, and
reflect different political rationalities.
Therefore, my approach to urban policy makes
conceptualizations of space central to its analysis. I
share the view with the social constructionist
approaches that problems and policies associated with
spaces of intervention are constituted as part of the
policy process, but insist that equal attention be given
to the ways in which such spaces are conceptualized
in policy. With the governmentality approaches, I
concur that the constitution of spaces through urban
policy has a governmental dimension, but maintain
that there is no inherent politics to such constitutions.
Variations in the ways space is conceptualized matter
as each policy discourse and programme is based on
particular ways of conceptualizing space, as the
French experience suggests.
Geographies of French urban policy
As Estèbe (2001: 25) notes, the basis of French
urban policy is its definition of a ‘geography of
priority neighbourhoods’; that is, a geography
constituted by the designated areas (i.e. ‘priority
neighbourhoods’), which then becomes the basis of
policy programmes and interventions. This basis has
remained stable over the two decades of this policy;
since the early 1980s, French urban policy
consolidated and acted upon a geography of priority
neighbourhoods. However, the ‘geography’ of
priority neighbourhoods has changed over the
years – not simply in terms of the number of areas to
be included, but in terms of the way in which the
included areas have been spatially conceptualized. In
this sense, French urban policy has consolidated and
intervened upon three ‘geographies’ – ‘local’,
‘relative’ and ‘statist’ (étatique) – each marked by
different ways of conceptualizing space.
European Urban and Regional Studies 2007 14(4)
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My account is aimed at highlighting these
transformations in spatial conceptualizations rather
than providing a comprehensive account of French
urban policy. The early years of French urban policy
(the 1980s) were marked by what I refer to, following
Estèbe (2001), as a ‘local geography’ that paid
attention to local dynamics and specificities, which
was a sign of its origins rooted in the self-
management and urban movements of the 1960s and
1970s. This was followed by what I refer to, again
following Estèbe, as a ‘relative geography’ that
implied collaboration between different territorial
units, which was a sign of the emphasis put on
solidarity and the welfare state in the second term of
Mitterrand in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The
shift to what I call a ‘statist geography’ – rigid and
centrally decided by the state – followed from a
change in the government in 1993, which was the
start of a period of experimentation with neo-liberal
ideas in an attempt to foster economic activity in the
neighbourhoods of urban policy. This period, as we
will see, was also marked by the consolidation of the
penal state in and through the neighbourhoods of
urban policy.
‘Foot-soldiers of democracy’: the local
geography of urban policy
French urban policy (la politique de la Ville) was
initiated in a specific context marked by the arrival
of the Left to power for the first time in the Fifth
Republic with a highly contentious political agenda.
Only a few months after the arrival of the Left under
the presidency of the Socialist Party leader
Mitterrand, several incidents of unrest took place in
the social housing neighbourhoods at the peripheral
areas (banlieues) of large French cities during the
‘hot summer’ of 1981. Furthermore, these incidents
occurred against the backdrop of ‘race riots’ on the
other side of the Channel, notably in Brixton, which
was haunting the ‘one and indivisible’ French
republic. In this context, the response of the new
government carried immense strategic and symbolic
significance. Strategically, the new government
could not have afforded the recurrence of such
incidents, especially faced with the opposition
Right’s severe critique of the new government’s
‘soft’ attitude towards immigration; symbolically
too, because the Socialist Party’s success was based
largely on the emergence and activism of a new
generation of militants and elites, mostly committed
to urban struggles. Indeed, the initial impetus for
decentralization reforms, which was on the new
government’s agenda, ‘had much to do with the
pressure of the social movements that produced the
1981 victory’ (Preteceille, 1988: 415), which means
that the Socialist Government was, and had to be in
order to maintain its locally based power, very
sensitive towards urban social movements
(Harburger, 1994; Preteceille, 1988).
Following the incidents of 1981, a National
Commission for the Social Development of
Neighbourhoods (Commission Nationale pour le
Développement Social des Quartiers, CNDSQ) was
created and attached directly to the office of the Prime
Minister. Hubert Dubedout, the mayor of Grenoble,
was appointed as the president of the commission.
Dubedout was one of the founders of municipal action
groups (Groupes d’action municipale, GAM) in the
1970s, which sought to promote the idea of
self-management (autogestion) at the urban level.
The appointment of Dubedout – a locally elected
official – carried immense symbolic value as a sign of
the new government’s attempt to alter the overly
centralist and technocratic state practices.5 The
commission was characterized by three major
orientations and sensibilities. First, there was an
orientation towards people working in the field (acteurs
de terrain) – called the ‘foot-soldiers of democracy’
(fantassins de la démocratie) by the members of the
commission (Harburger, 1994) – and towards local
specificities and experiences, with an attempt to move
away from technocratic practices that had
characterized earlier periods. Second, there was a
great sensibility towards urban social movements,
which, probably, was influential in the creation of the
CNDSQ with an urban-spatial focus in the first place
following the incidents of the summer of 1981. And
finally, priority was given to locally elected, rather than
centrally appointed, officials.
The Dubedout Report, Ensemble, refaire la ville
(Together, Remaking the City), was published in
1983, outlining the major features of a new approach
to address social housing neighbourhoods: the Social
Development of Neighbourhoods, or the DSQ. The
report identified three major orientations for the
DSQ programme. First, it was necessary to act on
the deprived neighbourhoods and the causes of their
European Urban and Regional Studies 2007 14(4)
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degradation in order to tackle problems generated
by the concentration of disadvantaged groups in
certain neighbourhoods, and by ‘social exclusion
induced by the economic crisis’ (Dubedout, 1983:
12). The deterioration of the social housing stock in
the neighbourhoods was only one side of a complex
problem, which had to be addressed in ways that
went beyond an exclusive focus on physical
improvement by taking into consideration issues
such as unemployment, poverty and education.
The second orientation concerned the
participation of inhabitants. It was necessary, the
report insisted, to take into consideration diverse
forms of participation, and not merely formal
associational forms. ‘There is not only one but several
levels of intervention of inhabitants in democracy at
the scale of the neighbourhood [la démocratie de
quartier]’ (Dubedout, 1983: 38). The quest was for the
‘democratization of the management of the city’:
In this quest, there are no privileged professions, no
monopoly of knowledge, no hierarchical level, no
command centres [base arrière]. Meeting this challenge
requires a mobilization of all those who want to give
access to the right to the city to all those from whom it is
withheld. This dynamism must be part of a new political
and technical organization of all authorities who manage
these issues. (Dubedout, 1983: 29; emphasis added)
The third orientation defined by the report
concerned the role of local collectivities. In this
respect, the report recommended that the role of
local collectivities be reinforced, giving them more
power in larger decision-making processes, while
increasing their responsibilities.
The DSQ programme started with these
orientations. The first 16 neighbourhoods were
selected in 1982, and seven more were added the
following year. There was not a standard, ‘objective’,
or formulized selection process; selections were made
by the CNDSQ working in consultation with mayors.
The members of the commission already knew the
social housing neighbourhoods well. The selection was
based on their knowledge of these neighbourhoods,
taking into consideration their specificities.
Although the DSQ programme was focused on
spatially targeted areas, larger dynamics were
emphasized in an attempt to avoid what Belbahri
(1984) called ‘over-localizing the social’; that is,
narrowly conceiving the problems of social housing
neighbourhoods merely as problems ‘confined’ to
particular spaces. The incidents of the hot summer of
1981 were seen as manifestations of multifaceted
problems, causes of which went beyond the confines
of designated neighbourhoods. The creators of French
urban policy were very clear on this issue: the
banlieues and social housing neighbourhoods were to
be seen as part of the production of space, related to
larger dynamics, and not as already given well-
delimited spaces with problems. All the ‘founding
texts’ of urban policy pointed to the limits of focusing
exclusively on selected neighbourhoods, and
emphasized the importance of taking larger issues into
consideration. The Schwartz Report (1981) on the
‘insertion of the youth’, for example, argued that the
central city and the neighbourhoods at peripheral
areas should not be conceived as separate. Similarly,
the Bonnemaison Report on prevention (1982)
emphasized the importance of conceiving prevention
policies on a scale larger than the neighbourhood. The
Dubedout Report (1983) went even further:
The opening up [désenclavement] of social housing
neighbourhoods implies an ideological breakthrough:
their inclusion in debates over the development of cities.
(1983: 76)
However, the strong political ideals of the DSQ
programme found little realization. Following the so-
called ‘anti-immigrant vote’ of the 1983 municipal
elections, the political context in which the banlieues
and social housing neighbourhoods was addressed
would change significantly. This initially
experimental policy programme, conceived to
generate new ways of thinking about the city through
creating a local political dynamic in the spaces of
intervention, started to expand to cover more
neighbourhoods. The number of neighbourhoods
included in the programme was raised to 148 in 1984.
The DSQ programme started to become a means for
financing renovation projects and prevention of
revolts, and the earlier emphasis on democracy and
right to the city started to disappear.
Restoring the welfare state: the relative
geography of urban policy
When François Mitterrand started his second term
as President in 1988, he declared that the city would
be one of his priorities, and efforts would be made
European Urban and Regional Studies 2007 14(4)
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for ‘inventing a real urban civilization’ (Banlieues 89,
1989: 3). A few months later, Prime Minister Michel
Rocard advanced reforms for the institutionalization
of urban policy. The decree of 28 October 1988
established the National Council of Cities, the CNV,
created an inter-ministerial committee (CIV),6 and,
more importantly, the Délégation interministérielle
à la ville (DIV), an interministerial delegation
responsible for coordinating urban policy.
The creation of the DIV not only served to bring
an administrative focus to urban policy programmes
within other state institutions and policies, but also
made clear that ‘urban policy was given greater
prominence, thereby symbolizing the commitment
of the state to tackling the urban crisis and in turn
encouraging a greater involvement of the various
ministries’ (Le Galès and Mawson, 1994: 27–8).
These changes occurred in a period referred to as
‘the return of the State’ (Barthélémy, 1995; Merlin,
1998), and they were in line with the new
government’s emphasis on solidarity and the welfare
state, reflected also in other policy initiatives of the
period such as the RMI (Revenu Minimum
d’Insertion [Minimum Insertion Income]).7
These reforms were accompanied by a significant
increase in the number of intervention areas. With the
Xth Plan (1989–93), the number of neighbourhoods
included in urban policy increased from 148 to 400,
including all the previously designated
neighbourhoods since 1982. Urban policy was no
longer an experimental policy concerned with a few
neighbourhoods, but rather, an ambitious programme
with 400 neighbourhoods to be tackled.
Institutionalization of urban policy continued
with the creation of a City Ministry in 1990,
following another series of revolts in the banlieues of
French cities. The problem for the new ministry,
whose mission was defined as ‘fighting exclusion’,
was to spatially constitute its object of intervention;
that is, spatially defining and delimiting ‘exclusion’.
‘Fighting exclusion’ meant to fight it spatially given
the way urban policy had operated since its
inception. However, this had to be done with an
already existing geography of priority
neighbourhoods – the ‘local geography’ of the 1980s
– which consisted of the 400 areas designated in the
Xth Plan. Thus, the City Ministry started to
collaborate with the INSEE (French national
institute of economic and statistical information) for
the statistical profiling and mapping of the priority
neighbourhoods of urban policy. A section called
City (Ville) was created at the INSEE for this
purpose. This collaboration was aimed at
reconstituting the spaces of urban policy as the
objects of a national policy in a more rational and
precise way. As Estèbe (2001: 31) put it:
What is at stake is the transformation of the essentially
local geography of the 1980s – based on reputations,
empirical and grounded knowledge [des connaissances
sensibles et empiriques], parallel histories of cities and
neighbourhoods – into a set of territories likely to become
an acceptable object for a national policy for fighting
exclusion.
The neighbourhoods were thus reconstituted as
objects of a national policy for spatially fighting
exclusion, using long-term unemployment, young
people aged under 25, and ‘foreigners’ (i.e. not French
citizens) as criteria. This new geography of the
priority neighbourhoods of urban policy was a ‘relative
geography’ in that the defined criteria were used to
measure the ‘gap’ between neighbourhoods of urban
policy, national means, and mean values for communes
and agglomerations of which they were a part. What
was measured, therefore, was the concentration of
long-term unemployed, young people aged under 25,
and foreigners in relation to mean values at the
commune, agglomeration and national levels. The
spaces of urban policy were thus conceptualized not as
separate from but in relation to wider geographies.
This spatial approach was also manifest in the
urban policy initiatives of the early 1990s. One of
these was the City Contracts (Contrats de Ville)
programme. These contracts defined a programme
of action between the state and the localities for a
period of five years. The programme was conceived
with three major objectives. The first was changing
the scale of intervention from individual
neighbourhoods to the entire city-region. The
second objective was to encourage mayors to take
into consideration broader social and economic
issues. The third objective was to encourage
intercommunal cooperation by bringing communes
together in devising projects to address deprived
areas. However, the City Contracts programme
encountered serious problems in implementation.
One of the recurrent critiques directed at it was its
‘stereotypical’ contracts, prepared with an aim
mostly to receive funding from the state with no
precise objectives, or with objectives which were
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aimed at redeveloping certain parts of the city
without addressing the disadvantaged areas. Inter-
communal cooperation also fell far behind
expectations (Donzelot and Estèbe, 1999; Le Galès
and Mawson, 1994; OECD, 1998).
Nevertheless, the City Contracts programme was
an attempt to encourage a more comprehensive
approach that took into consideration larger
dynamics than one that focused merely on delimited
neighbourhoods. It was also supported by many laws
passed in the early 1990s. The Loi Besson of 1990
defined the right to housing (droit au logement) as a
‘duty of solidarity for the entire nation’, and
required the departments to financially contribute to
‘solidarity funds’ at least as much as the state.8 The
Loi de dotation de solidarité urbaine of 1991 was
aimed at establishing intercommunal solidarity (as
was suggested in the Dubedout Report of 1983)
through a transfer of funds from richer communes
with less social problems to poorer communes with
more social problems. This was a significant
redistributive measure which was aimed at fostering
solidarity between communes. Finally, the Loi
d’orientation sur la ville (LOV) of 1991 was aimed at
a more balanced distribution of social housing
among communes by requiring them to meet the
norm of 20 percent social housing.
The transformations of the late 1980s and early
1990s shifted the orientation of urban policy from a
militant to a technocratic one, with a rationally and
more precisely defined geography of priority
neighbourhoods. This geography was a relative
geography in the sense that the spaces of
intervention were defined in relation to their larger
city-regions. These attempts to conceive the
neighbourhoods of urban policy relationally and to
address their problems through redistributive
policies, however, were disrupted with the initiation
of a new programme, the Pacte de relance pour la
ville,9 introduced by the Right-wing Juppé
Government in 1996.
Consolidating the penal state: the statist
geography of urban policy
Before the passing of the Pacte de relance, the new
orientation of urban policy was already signalled by
Prime Minister Balladur’s right-wing Government
which came to office in 1993. The three priorities
envisaged by the new Government for urban policy
were ‘authority, identity, and activity’. ‘Authority’
implied more repressive measures, and ‘identity’ a
growing concern with the ‘integration’ of second
and third-generation immigrants in the intervention
areas of urban policy. ‘Activity’ referred to tax
benefits for firms locating in the neighbourhoods
included in urban policy. Thus, the new government
associated the neighbourhoods of urban policy with
concerns about ‘the authority of the State’ and
‘French identity’ (Le Figaro, 1993: 6), and gave the
first signals of a shift in focus from comprehensive
approaches conceived to alleviate inequalities to
measures devised with an exclusive focus on
delimited neighbourhoods.
The Pacte de relance was the translation of this
orientation into law. The main idea behind it was to
foster economic activity and to increase employment
in the neighbourhoods of urban policy through tax
concessions and public subsidies. Trying to foster
economic activity and to increase employment
through tax concessions and public subsidies was
not a novelty brought about by the Pacte de relance.
Attempts had already been made in 1987, by the
creation of zones d’entreprises, inspired by Thatcher’s
enterprise zones, by the then Minister of Industry
Alain Madelin under the Chirac Government. The
LOV of 1991 had also envisaged giving local
collectivities the possibility of tax concessions for the
creation and extension of new business (although
this was never widely applied). The Pacte de relance
extended tax concessions to already existing firms,
and involved public subsidies as well.
The novelty of the Pacte de relance was what it
did with the geography of priority neighbourhoods.
For the most part, the Pacte de relance retained
areas that were already included under the City
Contracts programme, but turned the ‘relative
geography’ of this programme into a ‘statist
geography’ – absolute, hierarchical, and defined
through centrally decided criteria. What the Pacte
de relance did was to redefine the neighbourhoods of
urban policy through a scale, which identified
hierarchical spatial categories of exclusion. A
formula called ‘Synthetic Index of Exclusion’ (ISE)
was devised to assign the neighbourhoods of urban
policy to their proper places on a scale of exclusion,
which consisted of criteria such as the level of
long-term employment, proportion of young people,
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and proportion of people without high-school
diploma.10 The attempt in the relative geography of
the early 1990s was to measure the gap between the
neighbourhoods and their surrounding areas
through a calculation of concentration. The
designated neighbourhoods were seen as
‘neighbourhoods at risk’, and the attempt was to
discern symptoms of larger programmes and
populations at risk (Estèbe, 2001). This time,
however, the attempt was to measure how badly
these neighbourhoods were ‘excluded’. The Pacte de
relance transformed the relative geography of
difficulties into an absolute geography of exclusion
with rigid boundaries.
This was a major departure from earlier, more
‘local’ and relational conceptualizations. With this
particular spatial conceptualization, the
neighbourhoods of urban policy were closed upon
themselves, becoming ‘problems’ as such. The
inhabitants and local specificities, in the process,
turned into internally homogeneous spatial
categories, and the earlier ideas about appropriation
of lived spaces by inhabitants themselves
disappeared, which led Béhar (2001) to argue that
urban policy, despite all its spatial focus, was in fact
an ‘a-territorial’ policy in that it became
disconnected from local specificities.
The Pacte de relance gave French urban policy a
neo-liberal orientation. With this programme, the
focus of urban policy shifted from collaboration and
solidarity between communes to economic competition
among them. It was conceived almost exclusively in
economic terms, with an emphasis on economic
success within strictly defined spaces of intervention.
Whereas earlier urban policy programmes took into
consideration local specificities and relations between
designated areas and their larger city-regions, the Pacte
de relance was exclusively focused on neatly defined,
exclusive and calculable spaces of intervention, which
could then be classified, categorized and placed on a
scale. This spatial conceptualization had no room for
redistributive policies aimed at collaboration and
solidarity between communes within the larger city-
region. In the statist geography of the Pacte de relance,
the neighbourhoods of urban policy existed in and of
themselves, as neatly delimited areas that supposedly
contained both the ‘problem’ and its solution, provided
they were able to attract businesses.
Attempts were made to open up the spatial focus
of urban policy under the succeeding Government,
which came to office in 1997 with Jospin as Prime
Minister. The Jospin Government’s actions in the
domain of urban policy included an impressive
amount of measures, which were more or less a
remake of the measures of the late 1980s and early
1990s. It reintroduced the City Contracts
programme, passed two laws which sought to
encourage intercommunal cooperation and change
the scale of intervention from the neighbourhood to
the agglomeration, passed another that was aimed at
a more balanced distribution of social housing,11 and
introduced a large-scale physical renovation
programme which took after the Grands Projets
Urbains (GPU) of the early 1990s.
All three laws had a redistributional aspect; they
were all marked by an emphasis on solidarity (Goze,
2002), although they also implied more
responsibility and bidding for communes,
interpreted as a sign of the relative disengagement of
the state (Donzelot, 2006; Le Galès, 2005).
Nevertheless, these measures implied an opening-up
of the spatial focus of urban policy, which was
severely limited by the statist geography of the Pacte
de relance. The reintroduction of the contracts
meant a process open to negotiations between the
state and local collectivities rather than a geography
imposed by the technocrats of the central state.
The attempt to open up the spatial focus of
urban policy came to a halt with the change of
government. The Raffarin Government came to
power in 2002 with an agenda dominated by the
issue of security, and immediately passed laws that
gave more power to the police, extended the scope of
criminal offence, and intensified penal responses.
‘After measures aimed at restoring the republican
order, the fight against injustice has started,’
declared Jean-Louis Borloo, the new Minister for
the City, soon after the passing of these laws
(Libération, 2002). Borloo had three priorities for
urban policy: ‘breaking up the ghettos’; ‘jobs and
professional insertion’; and ‘simplification of
procedures’ (DIV, 2004: 24). Thus, for the first time
in urban policy, a city minister explicitly and without
reservations referred to the neighbourhoods of
urban policy as ghettos ‘at the margins of national
territory’ (Le Monde, 2003).
The priorities defined by Borloo guided a new
law on urban policy, known as ‘loi Borloo’, passed in
August 2003. This law translated the first priority,
‘breaking up the ghettos’, into demolition
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programmes; the second, ‘jobs and professional
insertion’, into more areas with tax concessions; and
the third, ‘simplification of procedures’, into the
creation of the ‘National Agency for Urban
Renovation’ (Agence nationale pour la rénovation
urbaine, known as ANRU).
ANRU would centralize, manage and distribute
subventions, thus providing a single stop (guichet
unique) for the financing of renovation programmes
(Depincé, 2003: 28). This indeed was a significant
reorganization, but the creation of ANRU meant
much more than just simplification of procedures.
The creation of ANRU, and the Borloo law in general,
recentralized urban policy. This recentralization
implied an urban policy which risked becoming purely
procedural, reduced to the physical transformation of
the built environment or to the designation of more
tax concession areas. It also took urban policy back to
the statist geography of the Pacte de relance and
remarkably limited its spatial focus.
The creation of the ANRU for physical
renovation, on the one hand, and the expansion of
tax concession areas, on the other hand, implied a
major divergence from previous urban policies,
which combined physical interventions and measures
with social aspects. Urban policy had always had a
social dimension. The Borloo law brought about a
dissociation in terms both of the nature of urban
policy and the relationship it had established between
the state and local collectivities (Epstein and
Kirszbaum, 2006; Estèbe, 2004; Jaillet, 2003).
Regarding the former, it narrowed down the
engagement of the state to physical interventions only,
leaving the social dimension to the initiative and
capabilities of local collectivities. Regarding the latter, it
dissociated the contractual relationship between the
state and local collectivities, which was also a feature of
the Pacte de relance. The previous City Contracts
programme was more flexible in terms of objectives
and actions, which were negotiated by the state and
local collectivities. The new programme, on the
contrary, was very rigid; it defined objectives and
actions by law. Thus, the objectives of urban policy
were given – not negotiated (Epstein and Kirszbaum,
2006). Instead of a process of negotiation, a
hierarchical relationship was established between a
central agency (ANRU) and local collectivities, which
risked reducing the latter’s role to a purely
administrative one executing the centrally defined
actions (Estèbe, 2004).
In spatial terms, the Borloo law took urban policy
back to the statist geography of the Pacte de relance.
This geography was centrally defined – not
negotiated – and absolute, constituted by neatly
delimited spaces of intervention as if they existed in
and of themselves. The attempts to open up the
focus of urban policy by encouraging projects
conceived at the level of agglomeration thus came to
an end. The Borloo law reduced the spaces of urban
policy to an ensemble of housing estates to be
demolished. Over the years, urban policy has
gradually shifted focus from the inhabitants
themselves to spaces of intervention. The Borloo law
carried this trend to the extreme, and transformed
urban policy to a policy ‘addressed not to inhabitants
but to space seen as a problem in and of itself ’
(Estèbe, 2004: 255).
Conclusions
As we have seen, French urban policy started as an
experimental policy with a limited number of
neighbourhoods: 16 neighbourhoods in 1982, which
went up to 148 in a couple of years, to 400 in the
early 1990s and to about 700 in the mid-1990s. In
the process, the neighbourhoods of the previous
years remained while new ones were added. By
focusing on the ways in which space is imagined in
urban policy, I have tried to show that although
urban policymakers have been addressing practically
the same areas for years, the ways in which the
intervention areas were spatially conceptualized (and
discursively articulated) have changed remarkably.
In the early 1980s, the idea behind urban policy
was to create a new territorial dynamic through the
‘spatialization of social policies’ – as opposed to
sectoral policies – and in this sense, it was seen as
innovative at the time (Chaline, 1998). Urban policy
was aimed at cultivating a local political dynamic
through its spatial approach, and was mainly the work
of militants working in the selected neighbourhoods
(Donzelot and Estèbe, 1999). Its neighbourhoods
were selected based on local specificities rather than
on centrally defined criteria. Starting with the 1990s,
the neighbourhoods of urban policy were constituted
as more precisely defined objects of intervention,
with clear boundaries and defining statistical
information. This emphasis on precision and
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statistical manipulation, however, was not premised
on a conception of the spaces of urban policy as self-
contained. Although their boundaries were now more
clearly defined, they were nevertheless
conceptualized in relation to wider geographies rather
than as separate entities in themselves, thus changing
the ‘local geography’ of the 1980s into a ‘relative
geography’. From the mid-1990s onwards, however,
this relative geography turned into a ‘statist
geography’ with the neighbourhoods conceptualized
as self-contained areas with rigid boundaries. This
shift in spatial conceptualization corresponded with
two other shifts: first, a shift from comprehensive and
potentially redistributive policies to initiatives
‘confined’ to the designated areas (such as tax
concessions); and second, a shift towards more
repressive and penal forms of state intervention, the
effects of which have been more pronounced in the
neighbourhoods of urban policy. Whereas the
neighbourhoods of urban policy were sites of political
experimentation in the early 1980s, starting with the
mid-1990s they have become sites where the
republican penal state consolidated itself.
By highlighting the changes in spatial
conceptualizations of intervention areas, I have tried
to show that space matters in urban policy. Saying
this sounds a bit like stating the obvious; after all,
urban policy is about space, or better yet, about
certain spaces. It defines the issues it seeks to
address in spatial terms, delineates spaces to
intervene upon, and proposes spatially targeted
remedies to perceived problems. Yet spatial
conceptualizations, as we have seen, change. Urban
policy does not operate with an unchanging view of
space. Just as the discursive terms with which to talk
about its spaces change, the way it conceptualizes its
spaces change as well. In other words, urban policy
is guided by particular ways of imagining space, and
different ways of imagining space have different
implications for the constitution of perceived
problems and proposed solutions. Depending on
whether spaces of intervention are conceived as
neatly delimited areas or in relational terms,
initiatives range from limited local interventions to
regional distributive policies.
Changing spatial conceptualizations has
another implication as well. I have suggested that
urban policy has a governmental dimension.
However, I have insisted that this is far from
univocal. Governmental practices are not about
interventions only; they involve both formation
and intervention. If we hold the view that space is
not already given in urban policy, then it follows
that urban policy is a governmental practice not
merely because it intervenes upon certain spaces,
but because it constitutes them as objects of
intervention in the first place. In this sense, the
spaces of urban policy are not the given sites of
this governmental practice, but, first of all, its
outcomes. Different policy discourses and
programmes imagine space in varying ways, as the
different ‘geographies’ of French urban policy
exemplify. This suggests that changing
conceptualizations of space and their policy and
political implications should be taken into
consideration in analysis of urban policy.
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Notes
1 This opening is inspired by the opening of a chapter by
Connolly (1993: 249) on ‘the American state’ and ‘the
Hegelian state’.
2 This is not to imply that all these notions were exclusively
‘Lefebvrian’. In the early 1980s, particularly, ‘self-
management’ and ‘right to difference’ were very popular
notions in the political agenda, with a variety of
interpretations. Lefebvre, however, conceived these
notions with a decidedly urban spatial focus.
3 As one of the referees suggested, there is a possibility here
to consider this argument in relation to Lefebvre’s (1991)
‘production of space’, taking into consideration the state’s
spatial practices and representations of space. Urban
policy, in this sense, may be seen as one of the ways in
which space is ‘produced’ by the state.
4 As Donzelot and Estèbe (1999) point out, the early years
of urban policy (the early 1980s) were marked by the
activity of militants working in the selected
neighbourhoods. This approach, however, remarkably
changed in the 1990s, and urban policy became more the
work of the state’s technocrats and bureaucrats than that
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of the local militants. It is this difference that I try to
capture with the terms ‘militant’ and ‘statist’.
5 As a former member of the commission put it: “We had
the feeling we were inventing a new State profession,
closer and more respectful of other partners, notably
locally elected officials” (Harburger, 1994: 386).
6 Thus, in 1988, the institutional structure of urban policy
was consolidated with the creation of the Comité
interministériel des villes (CIV), the Conseil national des
villes (CNV), and the Délégation interministériel à la ville
(DIV). The CIV, chaired by the Prime Minister, was
charged with decision making, the CNV with research and
proposals, and the DIV with the coordination of actors
and actions concerning urban policy.
7 The RMI offered a minimum income to unemployed people
over the age of 25 (provided that they were not students, and
were willing to be trained for or placed in work).
8 Departments are one of the three major levels of
territorial administration in France, between the regions
and the communes.
9 ‘Pacte de relance pour la ville’ cannot be translated
accurately, although it has been referred to as ‘urban
renewal pact’ (see e.g. OECD, 1998). The word relance has
economic connotations, and means ‘boosting’ when used
with reference to the economy, and ‘relaunching’ when
used with reference to a project or idea.
10 Calculations were made by using data on the included
neighbourhoods (the proportions of youth, long-term
unemployed people, and people with no high school
diploma) and their communes. The formula was as
follows: ISE = (% of people younger than 25) × (% of
long-term unemployed) × (% of people without high
school diploma) × (total population of the commune)
divided by the tax potential of the commune.
11 These were the ‘Loi Voynet’ of 1999, which sought to
encourage contracts conceived at the level of
agglomeration; the ‘Loi Chevènement’ of 1999, which was
aimed at encouraging intercommunal cooperation through
a redistribution of business tax between communes
provided they organized in the form of an Agglomeration
Community (Communauté d’agglomération); and the
Solidarity and Urban Renewal Law (Loi de solidarité et
renouvellement urbains, SRU) of 2000, which sought a
more balanced distribution of social housing by requiring
communes to attain an objective of 20% social housing.
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